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Abstract
We have examined longitudinally an ICT for development project in rural India,
closely watching activities and surveying users at as many as 100 Internet facil-
ities in more than 50 different villages. The Sustainable Access in Rural India
(SARI) project in Tamil Nadu, India, enjoyed many successes, including
palpable—albeit localized—social and economic development impacts as well
as the incubation of an—albeit inconsistently—celebrated ICT for develop-
ment start-up company (n-Logue Communications Pvt. Ltd.). Ultimately, how-
ever, the SARI project did not sustain itself. In the particular outcomes re-
ported here, we follow the prospects of 36 private telecenters which were
opened at various times between November 2001 and February 2004. By May
2005, 32 of these 36 telecenters had closed. However, in the same time pe-
riod, most of 42 telecenters in the same area that were opened and run by a
local NGO continued to function. We provide a comparative analysis between
these two groups of facilities. We ªnd that the best explanation for variation
in a kiosk lifespan was their level of satisfaction with n-Logue Communica-
tions. Moreover, those sites that did express satisfaction with their institutional
and technical support were in service for, on average, an additional year com-
pared with dissatisªed sites. In addition to technical and operational support
issues, we ªnd that the lack of long-term ªnancial viability was a major reason
for the closure of the private telecenters. Financial sustainability was not real-
ized by many centers; indeed, 85% of the operators interviewed cited ªnances
as a major cause for their closure. Finally, telecenters that were owned by indi-
viduals with prior training in computers, or that had a separate trained opera-
tor, remained operational for a longer period.
Keywords
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Introduction
There has been a huge increase during the last decade in the number of
projects in developing countries that use information and communication
1. ITID policy is that the Editors-in-Chief can submit at most one paper per volume year to the journal. The editor then
is recused from the process of blind peer review and publication decision making.
2. This author was a director of the board of the SARI project and participated throughout its lifetime. The research re-
ported here beneªted from the access this position afforded. Every attempt has been made to ensure that this paper is
evidence-based and free from bias.
© The MIT Press 2008. Published under Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial-NoDerivativeWorks Unported 3.0 license. All rights
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technologies (ICTs) for social, economic, and political
development. A number of these projects aim at
bringing the beneªts of ICTs to communities where
individual ownership of computers is low and use of
the Internet is infrequent. Among the methods em-
ployed by these projects, “telecenters” occupy a
prominent place (Gomez et al., 1999; Heeks, 2008).
These centers provide shared public access, often in-
termediated by an operator, to information and
communication technologies and services via com-
puters and the Internet.
This article examines an ICT for development
project in India, the Sustainable Access in Rural India
(SARI) project in Tamil Nadu, India, over more than
four years. Here, privately-owned telecenters oper-
ated successfully for over three years, but failed to
sustain operations thereafter. The SARI project
aimed at rural social, economic, and political devel-
opment by providing comprehensive information
and communication services through computer and
Internet kiosks in rural communities. The project
started in November 2001 with four computer and
Internet kiosks3 run by self-employed rural entrepre-
neurs. By June 2004, it had established 78 such ki-
osks in rural communities in Melur Taluk, an
administrative subunit of Madurai district in Tamil
Nadu. Figure 1 shows the loca-
tion of Melur within India.
These Internet kiosks offered a
number of services, including ba-
sic computer education, e-mail,
web browsing, e-government,
health, and agricultural and veter-
inary services, mostly on a fee-for-
service basis. Thirty-six of the 78
kiosks were run by rural self-
employed entrepreneurs, while
the remaining 42 were run by a
local NGO called the Dhan Foun-
dation. After over three years of
operation, most of the self-em-
ployed entrepreneurs had closed
down their kiosks. By May 2005,
32 of the 36 kiosks run by local
entrepreneurs had closed. At the
same time, the Dhan kiosks
mostly continued to operate.
In this paper, we examine the reasons for the
sustainability failure of the kiosks run by the self-
employed entrepreneurs. We also make a compara-
tive analysis of the two sets of kiosks and examine
why the Dhan kiosks continued to operate while the
other kiosks had closed down. We focus on the sys-
temic and institutional factors responsible for the
initial success and subsequent sustainability failure
of the privately owned and operated kiosks and at-
tempt to draw generic lessons from these factors.
The lessons learned can help us understand how
best to enhance the efªciency and effectiveness of
such projects and to realize their long-term sus-
tainability. We end with a general sustainability fail-
ure model that captures the principle reasons for
failure of this project.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
First, we overview some of the related work; then,
we describe the overall project brieºy and how it
succeeded initially in meeting the objectives of its
stakeholders by forging institutional partnerships
with the government and other agencies (both pub-
lic and private) for delivery of services; next we dis-
cuss the methods employed in our empirical study;
then we discuss the results including an analysis of
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3. These kiosks are similar in concept and operation to a telecenter, but are usually smaller, with often only one or two
computers.
Figure 1. Location of the Melur subdistrict in India.
the reasons for the closure of the kiosks; ªnally, we
analyze the critical failure factors and propose a
general conceptual framework for examining
sustainability failures in this type of project.
Related Works
A number of studies have examined the broad
telecenter/telekiosk phenomena and we will not
attempt a review of this broad literature here. An
existing summary and assessment of telecenter re-
search has been conducted by Kuriyan and Toyama
(2007).
And while telecenters have been in existence for
well over a decade now, researchers have only re-
cently paid attention to the long-term sustainability
of such projects. The results of such research has
been sobering; it has been noted that a majority of
ICT for development projects have failed either to-
tally or partially in achieving their stated objectives
(Heeks, 2003). Investigators have proposed a num-
ber of theoretical frameworks for understanding the
reasons for success or failure of such projects, in-
cluding the critical success factor (CSF) and critical
failure factor (CFF) models (Heeks & Bhatnagar,
1999); the “design-actuality” (Heeks, 2002) or
“design-reality” gaps (Heeks, 2003); scenario analy-
sis for long-term sustainability problems (Aichholzer,
2004); economic and ªnancial sustainability models
(Best & Maclay, 2002); and political and institutional
models that underline the lack of commitment on
the part of political leaders and public managers
(Bhatnagar, 2000). In previous work, we (Kumar &
Best, 2006a) have presented a sustainability failure
model built upon the work of Heeks and Bhatnagar
to help explain why projects that succeed initially
can still fail to enjoy long-term sustainability.
While researchers have proposed a number of
theoretical frameworks to help understand the rea-
sons for the failure of such projects, there are rela-
tively few empirical case studies that examine long-
term sustainability. The few examples that do exist
include a study of the Gyandoot rural e-government
project in India, which found that although service
satisfaction was high, usage over time was low, and
the poorest people were not using the services
(Cecchini & Raina, 2003). In another case study, lack
of regularly updated content and interactivity led to
the failure of a community-based e-government ini-
tiative in South Africa within a year despite its initial
success (Benjamin, 2001). Heeks (2002) has offered
brief overviews of several more cases of total or par-
tial failure of ICT initiatives in developing countries.
A number of earlier studies have examined the
SARI project itself. We (Kumar & Best, 2006) have
studied a subset of facilities and have shown that, in
their communities, 5% of the population had been
telekiosk users (a signiªcant increase in usage com-
pared to villages without a facility). This community
described a predictable diffusion of use pattern. In
particular, we found that diffusion was biased along
lines of gender (more males than females), age (us-
ers are usually younger than 30), caste (scheduled
caste members4 are less likely to use the facilities
save in those villages where the facility is located in
a scheduled caste area), religion (Muslims and Chris-
tians are under-represented as users in some vil-
lages), educational attainment (with few illiterate
users), and income (users are richer as measured by
standard surrogate indicators). In another study,
we looked particularly at diffusion of use (or lack
thereof) among females (Best & Maier, 2007). Our
ªndings suggest four main conclusions: 1) rural
women in this study ªnd ICTs useful; 2) there are
gender-speciªc usage patterns and perceptions of
ICTs; 3) obstacles to ICT use are generally structural
(time, location, illiteracy) and not personal (for exam-
ple, a prohibition from a relative); and 4) manifesta-
tions of gender awareness correlate with
perceptions of obstacles to ICT use.
In a focused study, we examined the success and
ultimate collapse of an e-government service offered
at some of the telekiosks (Kumar & Best, 2006a).
Through these facilities, village members were able
to access various citizen services, such as birth and
death certiªcations, old age pension services, public
grievances, and more. Through a series of data-
driven models, we demonstrated that the presence
of these services over the Internet served to increase
access to these important government programs
and that this access was particularly pro-poor. Ulti-
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4. These people, who Mahatma Ghandi christened the “children of God,” are members of castes who have historically
been discriminated against in India. They are referred to as “scheduled castes” as they have speciªc set-asides (essen-
tially afªrmative action programs) detailed for them in the constitution of India.
mately, however, these e-government services were
closed as new political ofªcers, who did not appreci-
ate or share the project’s vision, shifted into the re-
gion and undermined the project’s existence.
Description of the Project
The SARI project has been a collaborative venture of
several organizations: the Indian Institute of Technol-
ogy, Madras; Berkman Center for Internet and Soci-
ety, Harvard University; Georgia Institute of
Technology; I-Gyan Foundation; and n-Logue Com-
munications Pvt. Ltd. Initially, researchers at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology were also
partners.
In the project, Internet and computer services
were offered to members of the village community
at kiosks run as a self-sustained business with fees
levied for various services. These kiosks were man-
aged by two sets of operators: in some, a private
entrepreneur was in charge, while in others an
NGO, called Dhan Foundation, ran the kiosk. Dhan
aimed speciªcally at reaching the most socially and
economically disadvantaged communities in rural ar-
eas with their kiosks, and oversaw 42 facilities. The
other 36 kiosks were owned by self-employed rural
entrepreneurs. In a majority of the
kiosks, the owner operated the ki-
osk directly. In several cases, how-
ever, the owners employed a
separately trained and paid opera-
tor to manage the kiosks. There
were 15 locations where the
owner and the operator were dif-
ferent persons. All of the kiosks
received Internet connectivity from
n-Logue Communications Pvt.
Ltd., a rural Internet start-up that
was incubated through the SARI
project and spun out of the Indian
Institute of Technology, Madras.
Network connectivity was pro-
vided via a wireless in local loop
(WLL) technology, called corDECT,
also developed at IIT Madras
(Bhatia, 2003). In addition, n-
Logue was tasked to provide tech-
nical support and maintenance services to the kiosks
and also developed new services, recruited new
owners and operators, trained operators and sup-
port staff, and assisted in ªnancing of some
facilities.
We will refer to the 36 kiosks owned and oper-
ated by local entrepreneurs as “Chirag kiosks”;
Chirag is a branding concept developed by n-Logue
Communications (Figure 2). The other facilities will
be referred to as “Dhan kiosks.”
Achieving long-term ªnancial and operational
sustainability, where the facilities operate without
external ªnancial support and become a long-lived
feature of the community, was one of the major
goals of the SARI project (witness the “S” in
“SARI”!). However, after more than three years of
operation, most of the self-employed entrepreneurs
had closed down their kiosks. By May 2005, a total
of 29 of the 36 Chirag kiosks had closed down. At
the same time, most of the kiosks run by the Dhan
Foundation were still operating.5
Partnerships for Project Management and
Delivery of Services
Ostensibly, the SARI project was composed of a
“board” based at the four principal initiating institu-
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5. We should note that during this time period, n-Logue replicated and scaled the SARI model into additional districts
and states throughout India, at various times operating more than 10 additional projects. These additional projects are,
however, outside of the scope of this paper.
Figure 2. Students in front of a Chirag telekiosk with a Chirag signboard in
back.
Photo credit: David Desousa.
tions (Harvard, MIT, IIT Madras, and McKinsey) as
well as a project management staff based at IIT Ma-
dras in Chennai. Initial support for the SARI program
came from the Mumbai-based commercial bank,
ICICI, as well as a gift from the CEO of Analog De-
vices, Ray Stata.
This SARI team worked with n-Logue Communi-
cations as the local implementing partner with
n-Logue assuming most of the day-to-day project
and network management tasks. The Dhan Founda-
tion was selected by the SARI board to serve as the
local NGO partner. At ªrst it was envisioned that
Dhan would have a hand in all kiosks deployed
within Madurai district. However, differences in
management style and implementation philosophies
meant that ultimately there were two independent
sets of kiosks operating in parallel, with n-Logue fo-
cusing attention on the Chirag kiosks. In particular,
n-Logue insisted on a business focus limiting donor
largesse while the Dhan Foundation adopted what
they called a “pro-poor” approach demanding
larger and more sustained donor support.
Additionally, the SARI project had developed
partnerships with different agencies—both public
and private—to provide various
services to community members.
These included tie-ups with the
Tamil Nadu Agricultural and Vet-
erinary University for providing re-
mote agricultural and veterinary
services, and with a private eye
hospital, Arvind, for providing
telemedicine eye check-ups. The
state government supported the
project from the beginning with
ofªcial orders providing for bu-
reaucratic assistance and regular
contact with the program.6 In ad-
dition, the State government, at
times, offered e-government ser-
vices through the kiosks for the
issuance of birth and death
certiªcates, income certiªcation,
copies of land and cultivation records, complaints re-
garding civic services, and general petitions on other
issues.
The scope of the partnership with the local gov-
ernment was limited to two aspects: ªrst, it allowed
the kiosks to send applications electronically to the
Melur Taluk ofªce (the sub-district government seat)
for various e-government services, and, second, it
established a coordinating mechanism for monitor-
ing the processing of such applications. This coordi-
nation and monitoring was to be executed by the
District Collector through regular meetings with
SARI or n-Logue project ofªcials. While these coordi-
nation meetings were conducted regularly until the
end of 2002, they virtually stopped after the incum-
bent District Collector was transferred out of the
district in February 2003. At around the same time,
the administrative head of the Melur Taluk ofªce
was also transferred out. The transfer of these two
key ofªcials was one of the major reasons for the
collapse of the e-government services at the Taluk
ofªce (see Kumar & Best, 2006a).
Failure of these partnerships to sustain them-
selves over a long term period was one of the major
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6. The union government in Delhi offered support, in principle, to the project. However, it also delayed implementation
of the program for more than a year by refusing to sanction a backhaul ªber connection to Madurai City, claiming that
we intended to illegally provide VoIP services. The ªber backhaul was owned and operated by BSNL, the state incum-
bent operator. Fiber connectivity was ªnally provided after a meeting with the Minister of Telecommunications, the
Managing Director of BSNL, and the head of the Indian communications regulatory agency, TRAI. The request made by
the government at this meeting was that SARI deploy the project in the state of Bihar, in the North of India, where the
then-Minister had his constituency. This was never agreed to nor done.
Figure 3. SARI Project Partnerships.
reasons for the closure of the kiosks. We discuss this
aspect in more detail later. Figure 3 shows some of
these partnerships in the management and delivery
of services.
Institutional Framework for Operation of
the Kiosks
The project was launched within the broad institu-
tional and legal framework as laid out through an
executive order of the Tamil Nadu state government
in February 2001. This order permitted the sponsors
of the SARI project to launch in Madurai district. The
order mentioned that the rural kiosks would aim at
providing a host of services, such as agriculture,
health, telemedicine, and e-government programs,
for the beneªt of the rural population. To ensure
smooth implementation of the e-government com-
ponent of the project within the district, the Mad-
urai District Collector, the chief government
administrator of the district, was asked to play a
lead role.
Business Model of the Kiosks
As already mentioned, the kiosks were established
as self-sustained businesses, based on full-cost re-
covery through user charges for the services offered.
The charges levied for the services ranged from Rs.
10 (US$0.02) for sending an e-mail to Rs. 100 per
month for a basic computer course for school chil-
dren. The basket of services and popularity of vari-
ous applications varied considerably from kiosk to
kiosk. Above, we mentioned agriculture, medical,
and government services. These services were all of-
fered in collaboration with external institutions.
Some locations also focused on “cybercafé-”type
activities such as e-mail, voice mail, and Web
surªng. Additionally, many sites had a brisk com-
puter training business mostly focused on basic
Windows and Web literacy. Some sites also had en-
tertainment offerings, such as video clubs and
games.
The basic cost and revenue model for these facili-
ties was compelling: For a simple facility, the break-
even point, not including staff costs, would be just
US$3 a day, according to our analysis (Best, 2003).
This was computed, based on an extremely simple
cost model that included capital expenses of roughly
US$1,500 (which would cover a computer, basic
furniture, and a fan, and assumes that the center is
situated otherwise within an existing business or
home). Assuming the equipment was purchased on
credit, using the concessionary terms on offer to the
project, led to a monthly charge on the capital of
approximately $30 over ªve years. Average rent and
electricity charges were $25 and n-Logue charged
exactly $15 per month for network connectivity.7
This resulted in a total monthly cost of roughly $70
and a per-day break-even point of approximately $3
(assuming a six-day work week standard for India).
Operator salary averaged $1–$2 per day which
would increase the break-even point; alternatively, if
the facility was operated directly by the owner, all
income beyond $3 per day would be booked as
proªt.
This business model is described with greater de-
tail in Best (2003). With the addition of voice ser-
vices, it is argued that a SARI telekiosk should have
been able to be ªnancially self-sustainable, servicing
an area with as few as 100 households, given the
income proªles and ICT spending patterns of the
Maduri district.
Research Methods
Our primary variable of interest is, broadly, the
duration of time that each of the telekiosks were
“active”—those months when they were open and
being used for online services. There was consider-
able variation in the duration of activity among the
Chirag kiosks, ranging from a site that survived for
only 46 days to one that was open for more than
three years before closing. In addition, four centers
remained in operation at the end of our study pe-
riod. It is this substantial variation that we wish to
explain: Why did some facilities thrive while others
quickly folded?
In order to understand this variation, we have
employed a set of qualitative and quantitative ap-
proaches. While quantitative methods helped us to
understand the relevant statistical associations and
correlations among the different variables, qualita-
tive methods helped us in analyzing the institutional,
organizational, and individualized factors responsible
for the site closures.
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7. There were times when n-Logue proposed to charge up to $25 per month for Internet connectivity. It was not clear
to the SARI project exactly where their break-even point lay. In the end, the SARI board was able to insist on the $15
per month fee consistently applied.
Our most important source of data was a struc-
tured survey of 27 kiosk owners who had closed
down their kiosks after operating them for periods
ranging from one month to three years. We con-
ducted this survey in the months of August and
September 2005. These surveys were conducted in
the local language by two trained interviewers. We
also collected quantitative data from the records
maintained by SARI and n-Logue project ofªcials on
the performance of the kiosks. The period for the
data collected was from December 2001 to May
2005. Finally, we conducted semi-structured inter-
views with other stakeholders of the project, such as
SARI project ofªcials, n-Logue ofªcials, government
ofªcials, and Dhan Foundation managers. The
ofªcials we interviewed included the then-Secretary
of the Information Technology Department, Tamil
Nadu Government in Chennai; n-Logue ofªcials in
Melur; the District Collector and the head of the Na-
tional Informatics Center (NIC) in Madurai; and the
Executive Director and other ofªcials of the Dhan
Foundation in Madurai. We conducted 10 such elite
interviews. These interviews were conducted in Eng-
lish during July and August 2005 by one of the au-
thors (Kumar).
Data Analysis
Active and Inactive Kiosks
The number of operational kiosks in Melur increased
rapidly during the ªrst two and a half years of the
project. The number of Chirag kiosks reached its
peak of 36 in March 2004, while the Dhan kiosks
increased to a high of 42 in June
2004. However, when we analyze
the number of “active” versus
“inactive” kiosks, a different pic-
ture emerges. We deªne a kiosk
as active in a month if it had used
at least one hour of Internet time
during the month under consider-
ation. This unit of analysis is par-
ticularly attractive as our
measurement of it is perfect. We
had full access, provided by
n-Logue, to all network trafªc
data. A weakness of this variable
is that it could miss “active” sites
only with ofºine applications such
as video clubs or ofºine training.
Empirically, however, we noted no instances of this.
Analysis of this data reveals that the portion of
active Chirag kiosks declined precipitously during
the period of study. As can be seen from Figure 4,
the percentage of active Chirag kiosks at the end of
our study period was only 11.1% of the number of
facilities at its peak.
A similar analysis for the Dhan kiosks presents a
different result. The total cumulative number of
Dhan kiosks was 42 in May 2005, while the number
of active kiosks was 30; thus the percentage of ac-
tive Dhan kiosks was 71.4% in May 2005 (Figure 5).
Note that the absence of active Dhan kiosks from
March to May 2003 was due to suspension of the
Internet connections by n-Logue over a payment
dispute.
The above analysis indicates that the Dhan kiosks
have remained more active when compared to the
Chirag kiosks during the research period. While the
proportion of active Chirag kiosks was just over
10% in May 2005, more than 70% of the Dhan ki-
osks remained active during the same month. This
holds true even if we consider the entire period of
operation of the kiosks (from December 2001 to
May 2005). While the mean of the monthly percent-
ages of active Chirag kiosks for the entire period
was 53.7%, it was 78.1% for the Dhan kiosks.
Factors Associated with the Length of
Time a Kiosk Remained in Operation
Above, we described a precipitous decline in activity
among Chirag telekiosks. This activity decline culmi-
nated in the eventual closure of most of these ki-
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Figure 4. Percentage of active Chirag kiosks in Melur, relative to those
opened during that month.
osks. Reliable data on 26 of the closed or idle kiosks
showed that 52% of these kiosks closed down
within 12 months of starting operations, while 22%
closed within 24 months and an equal percentage
closed after 24 months, but before 36 months of
opening. Only one kiosk managed to operate for
more than 36 months. This range in lifetime among
the kiosks that closed is charted in Figure 6.
In order to understand why the Chirag kiosks
closed after varying periods of activity, we analyzed
the factors that may be responsible for these differ-
ences. We start with simple bivariate analysis be-
tween owner survey responses and this measure of
a kiosk’s lifespan. Using a two-
sample statistical t-test and as-
suming unequal variances, we
ªnd that the most salient factor
associated with the duration that
the kiosks functioned is the insti-
tutional, operational, and techni-
cal support provided by n-Logue.
For instance, Chirag kiosks that
reported receiving adequate sup-
port from n-Logue operated on
average for 753 days (n  9)
while those reporting no such as-
sistance operated on average for
345 days (n  18, t  2.97,
p  0.01).
Another important factor asso-
ciated with the duration a kiosk
remained in operation is the time
at which it started initially func-
tioning. We ªnd that the kiosks
that opened within the ªrst eight
months of the start of the project
(between November 2001 and
June 2002) stayed open for 679
days on average (n  10) com-
pared to only 364 days on aver-
age (n  17) for the kiosks that
opened later (t  2.16,
p  0.05). The start date for a ki-
osk does correlate strongly with a
kiosk’s impression of n-Logue
(with older sites approving more
of n-Logue). Thus, these two
ªndings may be speaking of the
same explanatory circumstances.
The next important factor as-
sociated with the duration a kiosk operated was
whether the owner and operator was the same per-
son. We found that those kiosks having a different
owner from operator functioned for a longer time,
remaining open on average for 597 days (n  15),
while those with the owners working also as opera-
tors remained open, on an average, for only 335
days (n  12, t  2.16, p  0.04).
Next, we found that prior training of the kiosk
owners was also important, though at a lower level
of statistical signiªcance (t  1.91, p  0.07). The
kiosks whose owners had prior training in comput-
ers remained functional for 645 days on average
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Figure 5. Percentage of active Dhan kiosks in Melur, relative to those
opened by that month.
Figure 6. Range of days in operation, measured as time from ofªcial open-
ing to ofªcial close (among 26 Chirag kiosks).
(n  10), while those whose owners had no prior
training remained open only for 393 days (n  10).
On a more qualitative set of assessments, we
found that when the owner reported that the villag-
ers liked their kiosk the facility was likely to remain
in operation longer (n  26, F  3.3, P  0.04).
Owners reporting that the village “did not like” the
kiosk remained in operation on average 149 days. If
an owner reported that the village “strongly liked”
the kiosk they were in operation for an average of
1,071 days.
We also asked the owners to offer their own
opinions on the closure of their kiosk. Respondents
were given a list of 10 reasons and asked to identify
those that they felt contributed to the closing of
their site. The results are indicated in Figure 7. If we
look at all 27 respondents, many of them (23) cited
the lack of voice telephony as a major reason for
their closing. The second most cited reason was
poor support by n-Logue, with seven mentioning
this reason, and the third reason, still with a fair
number of respondents attesting to this cause, was
the lack of ªnancial returns, with six positive
responses.
In Figure 7, we also show these results grouped
by those kiosks that stayed open8 for a “long” pe-
riod of time (deªned as being one standard devia-
tion above the mean, or having stayed open more
than 896 days), “middle” (below 896 and above
172 days) and “short” (below 172 days, or one
standard deviation below the mean). The most sa-
lient change apparent in this ªgure is the variation
in the role of n-Logue and the level of ªnancial re-
turns reported as reasons. We ªnd a particularly
signiªcant, and perhaps counterintuitive, difference
in reporting concern with ªnancial returns. Consid-
erably more respondents who stayed open for a
long period of time reported ªnancial returns as a
reason for their closure (4 out of 7), while only one
out of 13 and one out of ªve respondents reported
this reason if they stayed open for middle or short
period of times respectively (n  27, ChiSq  6.4,
p  0.04).
Multivariate Regression Model
Next, we perform a simple multivariate linear regres-
sion to further study the association of these various
factors with the lifespan of a kiosk. A multivariate
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8. “Days open” is measured as number of days from a facility’s ofªcial open to its ofªcial closure.
Figure 7. Self-reported explanations for failure given by kiosk owners.
analysis helps in controlling for other explanatory
factors and thus in eliminating any omitted variable
biases. In particular, we want to examine if the per-
ceived level of support from n-Logue signiªcantly
explains variation in number of days in service even
when we account for the other signiªcant bivariate
factors, such as levels of prior training. The model
that we used is speciªed as:
Kiosk number of days open  0  1(Difference
in the actual versus expected proªts)  2(Owner
and operator different)  3(Prior training of own-
ers in computers)  4(Gender of operator)  5
(Support from n-Logue)  6(Support from elected
representatives)  
In the above model, all the explanatory variables
except the ªrst one (difference in the actual versus
expected proªts) are dummy variables taking a value
of either 1 or 0 for afªrmative and negative replies,
respectively. For gender of the operator, we use 1
for males and 0 for females. We must note here
that, although the level of some of the independent
variables could vary from one kiosk to another (for
example, owners can have different levels of prior
training in computers, the quality of support from
n-Logue and elected representatives could vary from
one kiosk to another, etc.), we have classiªed all re-
sponses indicating satisfactory or better support as
1. We believe that this method adequately captures
the association of these variables with the function-
ing of the kiosks, without creating potential statisti-
cal artifacts that arise from the use of ordinal or
nominal variables in a multivariate model.
It is useful to further discuss the ªrst explanatory
variable, namely, the difference in the actual versus
expected proªts. The expected proªt for a kiosk is
the amount that the kiosk owner expected as proªts
per month before starting the kiosk, based on the
projections provided by n-Logue. The actual proªt is
as self-reported by the owners.
We ran the above model with data from 26
Chirag kiosks that operated for various lengths of
time between November 2001 and May 2005. Re-
sults show that coefªcients on three variables are
statistically signiªcant at 10% or higher levels. These
variables are: technical and operational support from
n-Logue, owner and operator being two different
persons, and owners having prior training in com-
puters. Support from n-Logue is the most signiªcant
variable. The signiªcant variables here are similar to
those found to be signiªcant in our bivariate analy-
sis. Furthermore, we ªnd support from n-Logue as
the most signiªcant explanatory variable when con-
trolling for these other variables of interest.
We present the results of the regression in the
Table 1.
As Table 1 shows, kiosks that reported satisfac-
tory or better support from n-Logue remained open,
on an average, for 327 days more than the kiosks
that reported little or no support, keeping the other
signiªcant factors constant. This variable has both
the largest effect and the strongest statistical
signiªcance.
Similarly, the owner and operator being different
is associated with the kiosk remaining open for 218
days more on average, controlling for these other
factors. Prior training of owners in computers is an-
other factor that is positively associated with the ki-
osk remaining open for more days. The overall
model is statistically signiªcant and explains 48% of
the variation in the dependent variable.
The results of the statistical analysis above were
corroborated by the qualitative evidence collected
during the interviews. All kiosk owners stated that
technical and operational support for delivery of ser-
vices from n-Logue was crucial for the successful op-
eration of the kiosks. The ªnding that kiosks lasted
longer if they had an operator different from the
owner was also conªrmed by qualitative responses
during our interviews. Most of the kiosk owners
stated that having a different operator facilitated the
task of coordinating with the public and private
agencies for delivery of services. It also made follow-
ing up for technical and operational support with
n-Logue personnel in Melur easier.
If we assume that the owner self-reports are ac-
curate, why was support from n-Logue not uniform
for all the kiosks? In other words, why did some ki-
osks (a majority) report receiving inadequate support
while others reported receiving satisfactory support?
We found that while all kiosk owners reported good
technical and operational support through the end
of 2003, the support declined signiªcantly after
that. The quality of support deteriorated in both
technical and operational areas. Four owners re-
ported that equipment failures were not rectiªed for
over six months. This forced them to close their ki-
osks as they were unable to provide most of the ser-
vices. Operational support also declined signiªcantly
as the number of support staff was reduced and the
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frequency of coordination meetings with the kiosk
owners and operators declined.
We also found that technical and operational
support from n-Logue was closely linked to ªnancial
sustainability of the kiosk. As the support from
n-Logue deteriorated, the kiosks were unable to
provide the services dependent on access to the
Internet, such as e-mail, voice chat, health,
e-government, and agricultural and veterinary ser-
vices. This contributed to a decline in the number of
users at the kiosks, resulting in ªnancial losses.
Kiosk owners also cited lack of voice telephony
at the kiosk as one of the reasons for insufªcient
proªts. They initially were given to understand that
voice telephony would be provided at the kiosks to
attract more users. However, a suitable voice license
from the government was never issued to SARI to
interconnect to the public switched telephone net-
work. As many as 23 out of the 27 (85.2%) kiosk
owners stated this as the main reason for lack of
ªnancial sustainability of the kiosks. However, as this
service was never provided at the kiosks, this is not
related to any actual decline in revenues of the ki-
osks over their period of operation. We think that
this factor probably only raised the expected proªts
of the owners. However, this does not appear to be
a signiªcant factor in explaining the variation in the
duration of functioning of the kiosks, as explained
in the multivariate regression model above. Qualita-
tive evidence suggests that if the owners had been
making modest proªts from the kiosks, they would
have kept the kiosks operational regardless of initial
expectations of a broader set of services, including
voice telephony.
To conclude, we think that the major reasons for
closure of the Chirag kiosks were two-fold: lack of
ªnancial viability of the kiosks in the long run and
poor technical and operational support by n-Logue.
We analyze the ªnancial sustainability failures of the
kiosks in more detail in the next section.
Financial Sustainability Failures
We will now move from our data analysis to a
broader view of the project failures informed by our
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Duration the kiosks remained open
(number of days)
Difference in the actual and the expected proªts 0.022
(0.89)a
Different owner and operator 218.14*
(1.94)a
Prior training of owner in computers 212.32*
(1.75)
Gender of operator 63.66
(0.71)
Support from n-Logue 326.60**
(2.35)







a t-statistics in parentheses
* Signiªcation at 0.10 by the standard criteria
** Signiªcant at 0.05 by the standard criteria
*** Signiªcant at 0.001 by the standard criteria
survey results, as well as informal interviews and di-
rect experience and participation with the project.
When we consider the ªnancial conditions of the ki-
osks, a number of issues seemed to contribute to
the lack of sustainability. We ªnd two main issues:
an informational factor (content and services) and a
technological factor (support).
Lack of Adequate Technical Support for
the Kiosks
As noted before, technical support for the kiosks
was provided by n-Logue Communications. A num-
ber of kiosks cited the lack of consistent technical
support as a negative factor on their bottom line.
One speciªc example was the maintenance of a re-
lay base station (RBS) which delivered wireless con-
nectivity to some more remote kiosks. The RBS sat
between the primary local Internet connection and
these remote facilities, with the job of relaying mes-
sages between the two. Four Chirag kiosks reported
lack of connectivity for more than six months due to
failure of the RBS and cited this as the major reason
for closing down. During July 2005, six Dhan kiosks
also had no connectivity due to failure of the RBS.
We also noted, through interview responses, a
range of service level that was delivered by n-Logue
in which some sites were given better and more
prompt technical service. The exact cause of this
“favoritism” is not immediately known.
Lack of New and Relevant Content
The Chirag kiosks had to mostly limit themselves to
offering the same basket of services during their en-
tire period of operation. There was no real success
in developing new and relevant content or services
for the kiosks. Interviews with the SARI project
ofªcials reveal that developing new content and ser-
vices was an expectation when the project was
launched. However, the Chirag kiosks did not suc-
ceed in this task. This was primarily due to lack of
adequate organizational efforts in this direction on
the part of SARI, despite continuous feedback on
the need for new content and services by the kiosk
operators. However, the Dhan kiosks were able to
offer some new services due to the efforts of the
Dhan Foundation in this direction. One example was
the new weekly online video-conferencing facility
offered to the farmers, where they spoke directly
with agricultural experts instead of sending an
e-mail. According to the Dhan ofªcials, this new ser-
vice proved quite successful in some villages.
Institutional Sustainability Failures
While direct ªnancial concerns were central to a lack
of sustainability, many of these ªnancial failures
were rooted in institutional and political failures.
These failures had contributing political, cultural,
and management factors.
Lack of Continued Support for
e-Government Services
As mentioned, the kiosks initially provided a number
of e-government services. This included successful
programs offering caste, birth, and death cert-
iªcates. In earlier work, we showed that these pro-
grams enhanced service efªciency and resulted in a
consumer surplus (Kumar & Best, 2006). For the ªrst
year of operation, the Taluk ofªce in Melur provided
good support for these e-government services. The
district administration also supported this initiative
through regular meetings to monitor the processing
of applications received in the Taluk ofªce. However,
this support came to a virtual end with the transfer
of the Tahsildar (head of the Taluk ofªce) in January
2003 and the District Collector in February 2003.
The Indian Administrative Service is a legacy of the
former British colonial presence and has maintained
their bureaucratic model, where government ofªcers
are “generalists” who take on short-term positions.
They are then systematically moved through posi-
tions and locations; therefore, the kiosk project
knew in advance that these key administrative
ofªcers had limited time periods in the district
with purview to oversee the e-government program.
It was predictable that, when they left, the
e-government program would be at risk, and in-
deed, we found that the program disintegrated in
their absence. The termination of this program de-
prived the kiosks of a signiªcant source of revenue
and a well-appreciated service offering.
Lack of Adequate Institutional
Partnerships for Delivery of Services
Much as the e-government service failed to maintain
itself due to institutional and political ºux, other in-
stitutional linkages failed, resulting in the end of
proªt-earning services. For example, early partner-
ships with a private eye hospital at Madurai created
a well-received telediagnosis program, focusing on
locally important health concerns, such as early cata-
ract detection. Similarly, collaboration with the Tamil
Nadu Agricultural and Veterinary College created a
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program in which local farmers could consult with
agricultural experts via video conference. The pro-
gram generated international attention after it was
reported to have facilitated a remote diagnosis that
saved the crops and livelihoods for 10 households
(Financial Express, 2002, 13 Nov.). These initial suc-
cesses notwithstanding, both services had virtually
ended by the end of 2004 and most of the Chirag
kiosks had stopped using these partnerships for de-
livery of services. Interviews with the SARI project
ofªcials and kiosk operators indicate that the main
reason for the failure of these partnerships was lack
of incentives for the outside organizations to con-
tinue. They were not paid any money for providing
these services to the kiosks and there was no regular
follow-up by the SARI project ofªcials.
Differential Performance of Dhan
and Chirag Kiosks
Why did the Dhan kiosks outlive the Chirag kiosks?
Detailed interviews with the Dhan and n-Logue
ofªcials and kiosk owners revealed a number of rea-
sons for this.
Additional Financial Support for Dhan
Kiosks
Interviews with the Dhan ofªcials in Madurai re-
vealed that the Dhan kiosks have remained func-
tional mainly due to additional ªnancial support
given to them by the Dhan Foundation. The average
monthly total revenue for Dhan kiosks was approxi-
mately Rs. 1,200 ($24) per kiosk, whereas the aver-
age total cost per kiosk (including the ªxed and
variable costs) was approximately Rs. 3,000 per
month. Hence, these kiosks were able to recover
only around 40% of their monthly costs. The bal-
ance was met through ªnancial support by Dhan. In
contrast to this, the Chirag kiosks received no similar
support.
Better Institutional Support
The Dhan Foundation also provided better institu-
tional support to its kiosks in two forms: appointing
kiosk operators centrally and developing its own lo-
cally relevant content for the kiosk services. These
centrally hired operators were placed at kiosks based
on need. The operators were paid their monthly sal-
aries irrespective of the revenues from their kiosks.
This helped the operators to focus on delivering ser-
vices to the disadvantaged sections of the commu-
nity rather than on generating additional revenue
alone.
Dhan also focused on developing content for the
kiosk services independent of the services supported
institutionally by n-Logue. As mentioned earlier, one
such service provided by the Dhan kiosks was the
weekly online video-conferencing facility between
local farmers and agricultural experts at Melur.
Comparative analysis of the two sets of kiosks
suggests that expecting ªnancial sustainability in ICT
projects in rural communities may be unrealistic, at
least in the short term. As noted before, both
Chirag and Dhan kiosks suffered from ªnancial
sustainability problem. However, it is important to
realize that the main reasons for the lack of ªnancial
sustainability of both Chirag and Dhan kiosks were
common: lack of technical and operational support
by n-Logue, failure of the e-government services,
and collapse of the institutional partnerships for de-
livery of services to the users. Where Dhan kiosks
differed was in receiving ªnancial subsidy from the
parent organization to cover the operational losses
and in obtaining institutional and organizational
support in the appointment of operators and main-
tenance of equipments. This centralized support was
missing for the Chirag kiosks. We still think that
both sets of kiosks could have shown better ªnan-
cial sustainability if the issues mentioned above had
been adequately addressed. Financial sustainability
of such projects in rural communities in developing
countries can still be a viable proposition if the insti-
tutional and informational sustainability is ade-
quately addressed.
Critical Failure Factors
Researchers have proposed that success or failure of
an ICT project can be understood in terms of several
critical factors. Heeks and Bhatnagar (1999) propose
10 such critical factors that can be summarized as
follows: information, technical, people, manage-
ment, process, culture, structure, strategy, politics,
and environment. According to their framework, our
analysis above falls within a number of these factors
as shown in Table 2.
Though the critical failure factors described
above capture the principle reasons for failure of the
project, they do not take into account the ongoing
or long-term sustainability of the project. Basically,
these factors provide an analytic framework to ex-
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amine a project at one point in time. To examine the
long-term sustainability of the project, we employ
the sustainability failure model presented by Kumar
and Best (2006a).
In Kumar and Best (2006) we describe a simple
sustainability failure model that explicitly codes for
the ongoing or long-term survivability of a project.
We argue that sustainability failure of a project can
take ªve principal modes: ªnancial/economic sus-
tainability failure, cultural/social sustainability fail-
ure, technological sustainability failure, political/
institutional sustainability failure, and environmental
sustainability failure. Considering the critical failures
of the project described in the preceding section, we
ªnd that the Chirag kiosks failed due to ªnancial,
technological/informational (due to lack of content),
and institutional failures. Bringing together the criti-
cal failure factors and the sustainability failures, we
ªnd that the project suffered from ªnancial, techno-
logical, informational, and institutional failures due
to management, information, technical, cultural,
structural, process, and strategic factors.
Conclusion
It is clear from the discussion in the preceding sec-
tions that the Chirag kiosks suffered sustainability
failures due to a host of factors. The foremost rea-
son was an expressed lack of adequate institutional
and technical support from n-Logue. Additionaly,
ªnancial issues caused by the failure to sustain insti-
tutional partnerships for the delivery of a number of
services, as well as the failure to develop new and
relevant content for new services, also seemed to
contribute to the failure rates. Thus, these kiosks
suffered sustainability failure due to ªnancial, tech-
nological, informational, and institutional factors. In
contrast, we found that the Dhan Foundation was
able to absorb the ªnancial losses for its kiosks and
had also been able to provide better institutional
support to them in terms of developing new con-
tent and offering new services. Though this analysis
may suggest that it might be difªcult to ensure
ªnancial sustainability of such projects, we think
that such projects can still be made ªnancially via-
ble, if the institutional and informational sustain-
ability issues are adequately addressed. ■
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